

Kinga Kálmán-Ungvári:

The Notion of Experience in John Dewey's Philosophy

The main goal of the study is to analyze the notion of experience in John Dewey's conception, which is undoubtedly one of the fundamental terms of his oeuvre. The importance of his enterprise consists in the fact that he tried to transcend the traditional dualism between object and subject, and he made important steps to realize a holistic, interaction-based conception about experience. Therefore, it is quite important to discuss the metamorphosis of the concept of experience and how it is working in different domains of life.

Sándor Kőműves:

The End of Art (Hegel – Gethmann – Danto)

This paper assesses Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert's description of Arthur Danto's „end of art” thesis by looking at Gethmann's relevant passages on Danto in her introduction to G. W. F. Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst. 1823. Nachschrift von H. G. Hotho* (Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg). The author of this paper claims that, by putting together Danto's slightly different descriptions of his end of art thesis, Gethmann's interpretation cannot be hold: Danto's writings do not support the view that he would misunderstand Hegel. More than that, Danto's interpretation of contemporary art is quite similar to how Hegel sees the function of art in modern times.

Deodáth Zuh:

About Newer Interpretations of the Relation between
Edmund Husserl and Gottlob Frege

A comprehensive and agreed-upon account of Husserl's relation to Gottlob Frege does not yet exist. In this situation we encounter interpretations that allow systematic dogmas to reappear that should have long been vanquished – for instance, that the author of the *Logical Investigations* was not only decisively influenced by Frege, but also that he had already retracted his sharpest Frege-critique by 1891. The present essay contains a largely historical response to W. Künne's new monograph on Frege that advocates such views. We shall argue that Husserl's supposed self-criticism does not turn on the critique

that he had earlier leveled at Frege's *Grundlagen der Arithmetik*. In this context, an important particular of Husserl's *Philosophie der Arithmetik* takes center stage: this book is a mosaic composed from old and new insights, a fact that becomes most evident in the two distinct concepts of "equivalence" that are founded there, which reflects Husserl's transition from a theory of arithmetic based on the concept of number to one based on the parallelism between proper and symbolic (improper) presentations. This change involves a long historical development that goes back to a tradition marked by the work of Bolzano, Lotze, Brentano, and Stumpf, and it is closely tied to the problem of how to distinguish between the sense and the object of an act. Systematic neglect of the historical background of the Frege-Husserl relation has led to disputes over who owns the copyright to the sense/reference distinction, but it has obscured the very core of the original line of questioning.