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King and *Tyrannos*, or on the Legitimacy of *Tyrannis*

According to the unanimous opinion of the ancients, *tyrannis* is a government without laws; in contrast, Socrates and his circle equate justice with obedience to laws. Can the theory of “good *tyrannis*” be defended on the basis of ancient political philosophy? Did the ancients possess the theory of “post-constitutional Caesarism”? The Socratic tradition is not completely clear on this point. Plato, Socrates’ greatest disciple, for example tried to put the ideal of the “good *tyrannis*” into practice several times, and in his *Statesman* and the *Laws* he repeatedly justifies this form of government, while condemning it in his other writings: “if a man, whether rich or poor, by persuasion or by other means, in accordance with written laws or contrary to them, does what is for the good of the people, must not this be the truest criterion of right government, in accordance with which the wise and good man will govern the affairs of his subjects?” (Plato, *Statesman*, 296e). As a matter of fact, Plato was convinced that raising a young *tyrannos* into a “good *tyrannos*” would be the fastest path to the realisation of his *politeia*, the form of government closest to the Forms.

The other Socratic, Xenophon also comes face to face with exactly this issue in his *Cyropaedia* and the *Hiero*, namely the problem of post-constitutional *Caesarism*. As shown by Leo Strauss, the ancients could have worked out the theory of *Caesarism*, but they did not want to: they saw the dangers inherent in justifying the replacement, under certain circumstances, of constitutional rule by legitimate absolute rule. We have reached the deepest layer of the “good *tyrannos*” issue: is the “good *tyrannos*” someone who, with laws or without them, guarantees his city’s happiness, is he able to do this, and does he actually want to guarantee the liberty of the citizens? Does the pursuit of “common good” – people being people concerned mainly with their own interest – necessarily involve coercion, i.e. the suppression of liberty?

Kosztasz Rosta: Thucydides, the realist

The scholars of Nietzsche struggle from a long while to understand the philosophical relevance of Thucydides in Nietzsche’s works which consist in the historian’s positive relationship to the sophists and puzzling opposition with Plato. This paper’s aim is to offer a proper explanation of Nietzsche’s

thought by presenting the philosophical connections between the sophists and Thucydides, and the philosophical strife of the Thucydidean and Platonic ethics. With the help of this historical background the Nietzschean notion of realism or realist culture, which is able to look into the depths of the world of *Werden* and grasp reality as something agonistic, perspectivistic, plastic and immoral, can finally become clear. The Dionysian power of the realist will also shed light on the “degeneration” of the Greeks into idealism.

Zsolt Bagi: The power of the masses and the integrity of the society

Spinoza's political philosophy is a unique phenomenon in the 17th century. Its affirmation of the power of the masses, its critique of the social contract theories, its insistence on the irrational nature of politics and social movements make it different in his own age but it also make it compelling for a contemporary interpreter. Present text summarizes in five points the reasons why Spinoza's theory of power is as actual as ever today. 1. His theory of power cannot be reduced to either a repressing or a controlling theory of power. It acknowledges the productive force of the local power or the power of the masses, while it limits the force of the global power or the state. 2. It does not consider the constitution of the society in the framework of a social contract. Social contract theories are spectacularly failed of late, especially in Eastern Europe where thousands of peoples felt out the society and were criminalized by the others. 3. It takes into consideration the contingency of the actions of the masses and the impossibility of its ruling. 4. It states the univocity of power, that is it does not differentiate between productive and oppressing power but productive power (*potentia*) and powerlessness (*impotentia*) based on the structure of inter-subjective relations (integrated or disintegrated society). 5. Its primary concern is to create an integrated (that is powerful) society, but integration does not mean totalisation in the sense of the Hegelianism. Integrity for Spinoza means plurality.

Tamás Hankovszky: Foundation of the Concept of Nation in Language Philosophy. Fichte: *Addresses to the German Nation*

Besides its cultural, political or even racial concepts established, *nation* was generally defined as a community of speakers of a given language as early as in the age of Fichte. Fichte also connected to this tradition considering the survival prospects and the mission of the German nation. However, in order

to give foundation to his hopes towards Germans under the rule of Napoleon, not only did he need to derive German identity from the national language but he also had to demonstrate that this language disposed of such superiority over all the other languages of Europe that bestowed some historic mission upon the Germans.

This paper is aimed at reconstructing Fichte's philosophical concept which gave priority to both the German language and the German nation for the very reason that – according to Fichte's philosophy – they had a significant role in giving an impulse to a history that had arrived at a turning point.

Viktor Geng: How can a man become a Minotaur? Michael Polányi on the Concept of “Moral Inversion”

It is rather a classical question how much philosophy and social science may influence political practice. One of the views says this influence is insignificant. This view is expressed most sharply by D. Hume. As he states, philosophers' errors are rather ridiculous than dangerous. According to this view's followers, politics and the power of authority are defined primarily by economic and social events. In contrast with this point, the other aspect says that the wide-spread philosophical and religious views might affect political practice themselves. Michael Polányi also committed himself to this later point of view. In his opinion, the 20th century's political disasters were the results of chiefly false philosophical approaches. He expanded his relevant theory while explaining his definition of “moral inversion.” In my work I'd like to present the essence of this definition.

András Pintér: The Role and Language of Power in Scientific Controversies: A Case Study from Socialism

The aim of the essay is to take a look into the scientific life of socialism and especially to show the role of political economy and its related Marxian terminology, which meant the ideological base of power. When was it worthy and when you had to speak this language? And when could it be successful at all? The case study elaborates a stage of a controversy about the methodology of national income calculation in the sixties of Hungary. The debate had not just national, but also international importance: most socialist countries made an attempt to realise the Western-like methodology in their statistical system, but Hungary was the only one in succeeding.