Abstracts

Volker Gerhardt: The Evolution of Freedom. Nature, Technique and Spirit in Hegel's Philosophy

This study – based on a lecture which was presented on 7 June 2007 in Debrecen – dwells on the basic problems of Hegel's philosophy paying particular attention to the connections between life and spirit, nature and liberty as well as to those concerning historical, natural and intellectual events.

János Weiss: The Necessity of Philosophy

The paper approaches the idea of the necessity of philosophy in the Hegelian interpretation of modernity. Firstly it discusses the historical of conception evolution, secondly it reconstructs it and in the end it examines the transformations of Hegel's conception concerning the relation between philosophy and reality.

Erzsébet Rózsa: Individuality, Conceptuality and System. The Statute and the Importance of Practical Individuality in Hegel's Philosophy

The study discusses methodological and conceptional questions that help to understand individuality – a very important subject in Hegel's practical philosophy. The author's opinion is that complementary relationship, which could constitute the basis of a relevant and modern reconstruction of these problems, lays at the intersection of subjective and objective aspect of Hegel's Spirit. The bases of these reconstructions are: the static-linear and dynamic architectonics of the Hegelian system, the distinction of dimensions inside and outside the system as well as the continuity of the basic motive of practical philosophy (the unity and the claim of unity) and its reference to the cultural function of philosophy.

Dean Moyar: Judgment, Inference and Action: Hegel's Logical Transitions in the Argument for Ethical Life

In this paper the author analyzes a very important and widely misunderstood move in Hegel's practical philosophy, namely the transition from morality to ethical life, by reading the arguments in Hegel's *Science of Logic* that are meant to provide the most fundamental justification for the transition. He argues that Hegel's theory of moral conscience should be read not only through

his doctrine of judgment, but also through his theory of the inference. Once this connection is made, it becomes clear that Hegel's move to ethical life in the *Philosophy of Right* parallels the transition in his *Science of Logic* from "The Idea of the Good" to "The Absolute Idea". This reading has the benefits of rendering clear how Hegel's ethical theory carries through the insights of Kant's theory of autonomy and of making more accessible the program and details of the *Science of Logic.*

Andrew Buchwalter: Hegel's Concept on the State as an "Earthly Divinity"

Of Hegel's many purported faults, one is certainly his apparent proclivity to invoke Spinozist categories in characterizing the state. Not only does he appear to regard individuals as contingent attributes of the state's underlying substance; his determination to see the state as divinely self-causative reinforces the view that political institutions are justified in and of themselves and thus unresponsive to those subject to it. While not disputing the centrality of the concept of divine self-causation for Hegel's understanding of the political, this paper not only challenges the assumption that this concept has the authoritarian and oppressive consequences commonly associated with it but argues that Hegel's unique use of the Spinozist concept entails support for a distinctive form of civic republicanism, one fully abreast of modern and even post-modern developments in politics and culture.

Francesca Menegoni: Confrontation of Rights in Hegel's Practical Philosophy

One of Hegel's practical philosophy essential features is that besides the formulation of general rights he permanently pays attention to particular rights. If it is true that the obstinacy of the singular individual has to dissolve into the morals of norms and institutions recognized as valid, it is also true that the acknowledgement of the sacred liberty realm in and for oneself – where the individuals may develop their personality and creativity – is one of the oldest and most invariable of Hegel's convictions. All of Hegel's moral-juridical and social-political framework is based on his holistic philosophy that entirely supports individual rights. The recognition of singular individuals and community's rights is the result of a permanently open confrontation that takes place when meeting the other: the individual as well as the community are stronger when able to assume and respect each other's identity.

Paul Cobben: Individuality in Multicultural Society. Searching for the „Second Family"

Hegel's claim that the institutions of ethical life, which he developed in the *Philosophy of Right*, express the subjective freedom of the modern individual cannot be affirmed. Hegel's *Rechtsstaat* limits subjective freedom because it is only understood as a monocultural state. The education into subjective freedom at the level of civil society only concerns the domain of labour, not the comprising values and norms. This limitation can only be sublimated if the education of civil society is understood as a cultural education. The consequence of this transformation is, however, that the "second family" is not interpreted as a labour community (as "Corporation"), but rather as a culture community. The nearer definition of the culture community remains with it problematic enough.

Paul Cruysberghs: Hegel's Concept of War in Nowadays Context of Interventionist Policy

The article examines the implications of Hegel's conception of the state as an individual. One of them is the possibility (necessity, according to Hegel) of war. War itself is considered by Hegel as a condition of ethical health for a people. Though Hegel is not clear about the question whether all citizens or only a selective part of them should serve in the army, the readiness of dying for one's country is an essential element of citizenship anyway. Still, this readiness contrasts sharply with the accidental character of the motives of war. Any futile motive can be advanced as a valid motive, in so far as it is essentially considered as an infringement of a country's honour. Today honour is no longer an honourable motive of war anyway, just like war is not accepted anymore as a valid solution of conflict solving. Wars have been replaced by interventions that are declared to find their legitimacy in human rights rather than in the honour of a particular country. The author suggests that the denial or at least the underestimation of the factor of honour in conflicts results in a perpetuation of the interventions that were supposed to be short and limited.

Kristina Engelhard: The Critique of the Kantian Theory of the Individual Subject in Hegel's Practical Philosophy

The paper offers a critical approach to the well-known opinion according to which Kant's philosophy is individualistic while Hegel's is holistic. After having demonstrated that this categorization originates in the Hegelian critique of Kant's philosophy, it focuses on the theories of the two

241

philosophers concerning subjectivity and communitarian existence of the individual. The conclusion is that Hegel's holistic ethic might be accused of particularism and when the social institution involved it doesn't assure the deserved value to the individual subject.

David P. Schweikard: Hegel on the Sociality of Individuals

The aim of this paper is to sketch the main outlines of Hegel's theory of the sociality of individuals. Although he does not offer an explicit treatment, Hegel's stand on this crucial question of social ontology can be extracted from his doctrine of "Ethical Life" in his *Philosophy of Right*. There, as argued in this paper, the essential social characteristics of individuals can best be explained in view of four types of relationship, i. e. the relations individuals stand in to 1. other individuals, 2. social groups and collectives, 3. social institutions and 4. themselves. Pursuing this systematic interpretation of Hegel's social ontology avoids confusing ontological and methodological questions on the one hand and normative questions on the other and it seeks to overcome the restriction of the study of Hegel's social philosophy to intersubjective relations.

Michael Quante: The Recognition as Ontological Principle in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*

In this research the author tries to reconstitute the conceptual relations between the self-consciousness, the "we"-consciousness and recognition. These constitute the basis of the Hegelian concept of pure recognition, as it appears in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. While attempting this the author argues the following thesis: recognition means in Hegel's philosophy a principle not only normative but ontological as well. Self-consciousness is constituted of recognition, which means that an "I" is not constituted only in a genetic way (that is through recognition perceived like a call of another "I"). This is a connection that Fichte pointed out, too. Hegel goes beyond this asymmetrical structure of recognition and demonstrates that "I" exists only in actual structures of intersubjective recognition. To make ontologically plausible this constituent and causal function, in the end we reconstruct Hegel's ideas with the help of some models from analytical philosophy, offered by the ontology of occurrence and by the theory of action.

Rainer Adolphi: The „We"-World of the Individuals.
Hegel and Max Weber on Social Orientation
of Modern Subjectivity

In this paper the author discusses a Hegelian theory of human "com-munitarian" self-understanding – and the arguments and consequences not found in Hegel himself. Hegel's concept of the "Spirit" (as an interrelation of "Me" and "We") in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* gives a basis for a critical approach to social relations, customs and moral behaviour, but it must be interpreted by a "philosophical" reading of Max Weber's explanation of modern subjectivity in his *Protestant Ethic*. In the sense of Hegel and Weber, "Spirit" instead of "culture", "values", "norms", "attitudes", "habits" etc. is not necessarily connected with an "idealistic" theory, neither substantialistic (holistic) nor mentalistic. To give an outline of this interpretation the author concentrates on the following issues: the normativity of subjectivity; "We"-imago (the forum of the "We"); "moral facts" – the languages of morality; behaviour and intellectual moti-vation; pseudoethical behaviour in the world of social institutions.

Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch:
Law Equality and Personal Respect

The aim of the paper is to show that Hegel's notion of personal respect is of great interest to contemporary Critical Theory. The author analyzes this notion, which can be found in the *Philosophy of Right*, and offers a new interpre-tation of the conceptual relation between personal respect and the institutions of (private) property and (capitalist) markets. He shows why Hegel's concept of personal respect allows us to understand markets as possible institutionaliza-tions of this kind of recognition and why it is compatible with a critique of neoliberal capitalism. This being so, the author argues, Hegel's notion of per-sonal respect can help solve one of the major problems of contemporary Critical Theory.