Abstracts

David J. Chalmers: The Puzzle of Conscious Experience

See *Scientific American*, Dec. 1995, 62–68.

Susan L. Hurley: The Reappearing Self

See Hurley: Introduction: The Reappearing Self. In Susan L. Hurley: *Consciousness in Action*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998, 1–24.

Andy Clark: I am John's Brain

See *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 2/1995, 144–148.

Boldizsár Eszes – János Tőzsér: What is Analytic Philosophy?

In their introductory essay, the authors first survey the history of analytic philosophy from the beginnings to the present, dividing it into three phases. The first phase includes the early Russell, the early Wittgenstein and Logical Positivism, the second one the ordinary language philosophy, while the third one, the period from the 50's to present-day developments includes naturalism in the philosophy of mind, Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction and his naturalized epistemology and the revival of analytic metaphysics through Kripke.

In the second part of the essay, the authors consider some proposals to define analytic philosophy, and argue that although one cannot give an exact, comprehensive definition, its most distinctive characteristic is its problem-oriented approach to the big questions of philosophy, in contrast to the so-called continental tradition.

Gergely Ambrus: *Weltanschauung* and Theories of Perception in the History of Analytic Philosophy

The paper provides a large-scale typology of some major theories of perception in 20th century analytic philosophy and a description of how these theories are connected with a general metaphysical issue, the mind-world relation. It divides into two parts. In the first, "given-based" theories of perceptions, which hold that phenomenal experience plays a fundamental role in perception and is

343

ontologically basic, and adjoining views of the mind-world relation are consi-
dered, which were dominant in the first half of the century. In the second, some
alternatives to the given-based approaches are presented, namely naturalist and
therapeutic approaches, which were prominent in the second half of the cen-
tury. They comprise, on the one hand, some materialist theories of perception,
which take physical entities to be basic (identity, supervenience and eliminativist
views), and naturalist dualism, which holds that physical entities and experience
are ontologically on a par; on the other, some important "therapeutic" approa-
ches (i.e. semantic, pragmatic, and conceptualist therapies for the problem of
mind-world nexus), with a focus on McDowell's conceptualist views.

Gábor Forrai: A Dialogue on Belief and Intentionality

The paper is a dialogue between Dan (standing for Daniel Dennett) and
Jed (standing for a mixture of Jerry Fodor, Ned Block and Fred Dretske), which
explores the relation between two very different approaches to the naturalistic
treatment of intentionality and mental content. It begins with Jed's argument
for a reductionist and strongly realist view, which is then challenged by Dan
on various points. It emerges from the discussion what reasons Dennett has for
disagreeing with the mainstream approach and also why his own position is
difficult to pin down.

Tamás Demeter: Philosophical Debates on Folk Psychology

In this survey article I introduce some theories of folk psychology and point
out some of their problems. I group them into two main camps, i.e. into classical
Humean and non-Humean versions, depending on their attitude towards the
nature and function of mental states ascribed by our folk psychological prac-
tice. The main questions discussed here are mainly about the account they give
of the meaning of folk psychological terms and of the function and practice of
mental ascription.

András Simonyi: Conceivability Arguments for Dualism

One of the characteristic features of Descartes's philosophical system is its
ontologically dualist picture of human beings: the human mind and body are
totally distinct substances, whose connection is limited to a rather mysterious
causal interaction taking place in the pineal gland of the brain. Descartes' most
famous argument for his thesis about the "real distinction" between mind and
body, the so called "epistemological" or "conceivability" argument, shows a remar-
kable similarity to those arguments which were recently advanced by the
modern supporters of dualism. Both Descartes and some leading neo-dualists,
most notably D. Chalmers claim that the conceivability of certain situations

guarantees its (metaphysical) possibility, and on the basis of this metaphysical thesis they try to draw dualist ontological conclusions which are supposedly valid in our *actual* world. In spite of the obvious resemblance, Chalmers suggests that while the formulation given by Descartes is not sound, his line avoids the problems of the original version, partly because it is based on a more penetrating, "two-dimensional" analysis of the semantics of modal statements. The aim of this paper is to examine shortly this claim on the basis of a reconstruction and comparison of the original and the new "Cartesian" arguments.

Mihály Boda: Challenges against Intentional Theory of Perception

One of the most important theories of perception is intentionalism. According to intentionalism to explain perception we need not to ask what ontological status the *object* of perception has, as naiv realism and idea theory do, but we have to give account of the *structure* of perception. Thus, a state of perception is a kind of mental state having two essential properties. The first property is that perception is conceptual, which means that we always can give description of perception. The second property is that perception is representational, which means that perception always has object (whether physical or mental or something else) or in other words: perception is always *about* something. In recent years intentionalism was attacked regarding these two properties. On one hand qualia realism claims that perception is partly non-representational, on the other, non-conceptual theory claims that perception is not wholly conceptual. In my paper I first introduce intentionalism, then I examine arguments against intentionalism. Finally I draw the conclusion that intentionalism – in its original version – is not maintainable, and I offer a theory, phenomenal constitutionalism, on the basis of which we can re-think intentionalism.

András Bács: Possible Worlds

Reasons are given why the metaphysical concept of a possible world due to Leibniz was side-lined for a long time, and why there is renewed interest in it in current analytic philosophy. The paper then offers a brief overview of the current debate in analytic philosophy about the existence and nature of possible worlds, with some of the major positions and arguments backing them presented.

Miklós Márton: Problems of Reference

In this paper I make a survey of the main accounts of reference in the 20th century. During this I concentrated mainly on the two syntactically simple linguistic devices, namely names and indexical terms, by which we can refer to individual objects in the world. According to my interpretation, the difference

amongst the treated accounts can be grasped in the terms of two intuitively equally plausible criteria of the relation between a linguistic utterance and the thought manifested in it. The first one, which Gareth Evans called "Russell's Principle", holds that we must know what we say, so the thought expressed by a sentence have intrinsic relation to the object it is about. The second one, which is called externalism, conversely holds that to answer the question what our linguistically expressed thoughts are about, we must consider the world and the other speakers around us, and consequently it is possible to err in the content of our thoughts. I am arguing in the paper that the more an account match one of the two demand, the less plausibility it have from the point of view of the other.

Zsófia Zvolenszky: Russell's Firm Theory of Definite Descriptions

According to Russell, definite descriptions are quantified expressions. Following Strawson's lead, others think that at least some definite descriptions are referential. The primary suspects are incomplete descriptions like "the pug", which do not pick out a unique entity but can nevertheless be part of true utterances as in "the pug is asleep", uttered with a single sleeping pug in view. This is easily captured if we treat "the pug" as referring to the conversationally salient pug. By contrast, Russell's theory (in its basic form at least) equates such utterances to "exactly one pug exists and it is asleep", which is false because the world contains several pugs. This paper argues that incomplete descriptions in fact strengthen the case for Russell's theory for two reasons. First, the referential alternative is far too limited to provide a genuine remedy for the problems posed by incomplete descriptions. Second, there is an overwhelmingly plausible way to deflect a popular argument that the similarity between incomplete descriptions and complex demonstratives like "that pug" calls for a referential treatment for both.

János Kelemen: A Short Outline of the History of Analytical Philosophy of History

The essay gives a short outline of analytical philosophy of history from Hempel's classical essay (*The Function of General Laws in History*, 1942) to Danto's *The Decline and Fall of the Analytical Philosophy of History* of 1995, and draws the conclusion that, in spite of the fact that in the last years there is little novelty in this field, the problems raised by the analytical philosophy of history are still worthy of being explored.

Jenő Pöntör: Skepticism and Externalism

Skepticism is the central problem for epistemology. The skeptic's view is that we can't know anything, or we can't know anything about some specific topic. In this paper first I sketch the problem, then present epistemic externalism a popular way in contemporary analitic philosophy intended to solve it.

Tibor Bárány: Works of Art and Mere Real Things
Arthur C. Danto and the Analytical Philosophy of Art

My paper is devoted to an exposition of Arthur C. Danto's philosophy of art. In *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* Danto is seeking for and trying to capture the essential nature of art. Danto's well-known thought-experiment based on indiscernible works of art and mere real things proves: the distinguishing characteristics of art are not something that can be detected perceptually, so the correct definition of artwork cannot contain perceptual properties. In my paper I examine both Danto's theory of art focusing on non-manifest, non-perceptual properties of artworks and the most important rivals of Danto's theory: the wittgensteinian view of art (the essence of art is not definable, art is an open concept), the institutional theory of art, the theory of aesthetic distance, the affective theory of art, and last but not least the theory which has the most famous intellectual career in the history of philosophy, the mimetic theory of art.

Zoltán Miklósi: Political Obligations:
the Problem of Particularity

The paper proposes a specific account of political obligation. It starts with discussing the criteria that any successful theory of political obligation must satisfy. Then it proceeds to present the three most important contemporary theories of political obligation, and discusses their respective strengths and weaknesses in terms of the criteria stated in the introduction. It singles out the so-called natural duty account, which the author considers to be superior to its rivals, and examines how this theory may deal with the difficulty – the so-called particularity requirement – that is generally assumed to be the major weakness of theories of this sort. Finally, it proposes an argumentative strategy with which the natural duty theory of political obligation can successfully deflect the particularity difficulty.

László Sz. Imre: Ferenc Huoranszki's
Analytical Metaphysics

In my essay I review Ferenc Huoranszki's book *Modern metafizika* (Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2001). I list here shortly the points of the book I criticize in detail in my essay.

1. According to Huoranszki the logical empiricists hold that metaphysical statements are meaningless because they are not verifiable empirically. I think that it is not what they really meant. 2. He suggests that the modern metaphysics originated with the criticism of logical empiricism. I think that it did with the modal logic. 3. His presentation of the realist's criteria to differentiate between laws of nature and accidental generalizations has a gap. 4. I argue that Reichenbach's example does not work against the logical empiricists' concep-

tion of laws. 5. Huoranszki uses ambiguously the words "law" and "support". 6. His account of the realist theory of the laws of nature is circular. 7. It is not clear what he means by "causal connection" in his argument against Hume's theory of causal connection. 8. His analysis of historical contrafactual statements is unconvincing. 9. He accepts some theses of Lewis's theory of causality he rejected in his criticism of Hume's theory. 10. I criticize his proof of the existence of possible worlds on the basis of the existence of the laws of nature. 11. His argument against set nominalism is incompatible with his points about vague identity of objects. 12. I criticize his reconstruction of Gibbard's arguments of contingent identity.

Zsombor Méder: Adequate Words and the Things – the Analytical Language of John Wilkins

This paper focuses on John Wilkins' *Essay Toward a Real Character and a Philosophical Language*. Following Foucault's *The Order of Things*, I attempt to outline the mid-seventeenth century milieu from which Wilkins' plan to construct a universal language emerged. I try to show that the principal achievments of the *Essay* are contained in the Tables, "containing a regular enumeration and description of all [...] things and notions". The paper concludes that the philosophical intuition according to which such a systematization is possible and desirable should probably be abandoned.

László Végh: Frege and the Julius Caesar-problem

The aim of Frege's logicism was to define the natural numbers by giving a purely logical foundation – the main ideas were described in *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* in 1884, the precise and formal logical elaboration was given in *Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*. This magnificant work unfortunately proved to be inconsistent, as shown by Russell's paradox. In this paper we consider a weaker definition proposed in the *Grundlagen*, which provides a consistent foundation of the arithmetic. However, this definition was not satisfactory for Frege, leaving open the following question: are number 0 and Julius Caesar the same? We analyze this problem and show why it really makes sense. The question turns out to be a cardinal difficulty concerning the concept of the numbers, showing the borders of definability: logic is insufficient to ensure 0 and Julius Caesar to be different.